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3 
Monetary consequences of alternative fiscal policy 
rules 






In this paper we analyse the monetary impact of alternative fiscal policy rules 
using the debt and deficit, both mentioned as measures of fiscal policy 
performance in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). We use a New Keynesian 
model, with endogenous labour supply, distortionary taxation and no private 
capital. The economy is hit by two fundamental shocks: demand and supply 
shocks, which are orthogonal to each other. Monetary policy is conducted by an 
independent central bank that will optimise. Under discretionary monetary policy 
the size of the inflation bias depends on the fiscal policy regime. Using the 
timeless perspetive approach to precommitment, output persistence increase 
compared to the discretionary case. The result holds with the alternative fiscal 
policy rules, and inflation and output persistence reflects the economic data. With 
the deficit rules, the autocorrelation of the tax rate is near unity irrespective of the 
monetary policy regime, and irrespective of the fiscal policy parameters and 
targets. 
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4 
Vaihtoehtoisen finanssipolitiikan sääntöjen 
monetaariset vaikutukset 






Tässä tutkimuksessa käydään läpi vaihtoehtoisten finanssipolitiikan sääntöjen mo-
netaarisia vaikutuksia. Tutkimuksessa käytetyt finanssipolitiikan säännöt perustu-
vat joko julkisen sektorin velkaan tai alijäämään, jotka molemmat ovat vakaus- ja 
kasvusopimuksessa finanssipolitiikan tilan mittareita. Vaikutuksia arvioidaan uus-
keynesiläisessä mallissa, jossa työn tarjonta määräytyy endogeenisesti ja jossa ve-
rotuksen vääristävät vaikutukset on otettu huomioon. Lisäksi talouteen vaikuttaa 
kaksi toisistaan riippumatonta sokkia, kysyntä- ja tarjontasokki. Riippumaton 
keskuspankki harjoittaa optimointiin perustuvaa itsenäistä rahapolitiikkaa. Raha-
politiikan ollessa harkinnanvaraista talouden inflaatiotaipumus riippuu harjoitetus-
ta finanssipolitiikasta. Jos rahapolitiikka perustuu ajasta riippumattomaan sään-
töön, tuotannon persistenssi taloudessa kasvaa verrattuna harkinnanvaraiseen 
rahapolitiikkaan. Tämä tulos on riippumaton valitusta verosäännöstä, ja sekä inf-
laation että tuotannon persistenssi vastaavat taloudessa havaittavia arvoja. Kun 
finanssipolitiikassa sovelletaan alijäämään perustuvaa sääntöä, veroasteen auto-
korrelaatio on lähellä yhtä riippumatta vallitsevasta rahapolitiikasta sekä valituista 
finanssipolitiikan parametri- ja tavoitearvoista. 
 
Avainsanat: inflaatio, optimaalinen rahapolitiikka, finanssipolitiikka, politiikka 
koordinaatio 
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There is a huge literature about optimal monetary policy. In these papers
the ﬁscal policy is simple or even not modelled at all. The description of
more detailed ﬁscal and monetary policy was reintroduced by Sargent and
Wallace (1981) in their unpleasant monetaristic arithmetics. The government
has access to a subsidy to factor inputs ﬁnanced with lump-sum taxes aimed
at dismantling the ineﬃciency introduced by imperfect competition in product
markets.
The literature on monetary policy has focused on how the monetary policy
can stabilise the economy under shocks, mainly technology shocks. Benhabib
and Wen (2004) claim that an aggregate demand shock is able to explain
the actual ﬂuctuation in the RBC models. From a Keynesian point of view,
demand shocks are thought to be important for generating business cycles
because the slow adjustment in prices may cause resources to be under-utilised,
making possible the expansion of output without increases in marginal costs
in response to higher aggregate demand.
In this literature the society usually delegates monetary policy to an
independent and conservative central bank that shares the welfare function
of the society but puts more emphasis on inﬂation than the society does1.B y
independence we mean that the central bank has full control over the monetary
policy instruments and chooses how much public debt is monetised. However,
as shown in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b), with even a small degree of
price stickiness optimal inﬂation volatility is close to zero.
In another fast-growing literature on optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy,
the behaviour of both policy-makers is based on optimisation, and therefore
the ﬁscal authority aﬀects the price level determination. For example
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003, 2004a and 2004b) ﬁnd that ﬁscal policy in
a model with distortionary taxation aﬀects the determination of steady state
inﬂation and inﬂation volatility. This opens another determination channel
of the inﬂation bias, since as in Siu (2004) the ﬁscal policy tries to balance a
spending shock by absorbing inﬂation beneﬁts. We claim that the size of the
inﬂation bias depends on the ﬁscal policy regime when ﬁscal policy follows a
ﬁscal rule.
Siu (2004) states that an important result of the optimal policy literature
is the prescription of policies that smooth tax distortions over time and across
states of nature. When governments ﬁnance stochastic government spending
by taxing labour income and issuing one-period debt, state-contingent returns
on that debt allow tax rates to be roughly constant, as in Lucas and Stokey
(1983) and also Chari et al (1991 and 1994). Siu (2004) continues that the
serial correlation properties of optimal tax rates and real government debt
diﬀer in ﬂexible and sticky price models. In contrast to Barro’s (1979) random
walk result ,Chari et al (1991 and 1994) show that with ﬂexible prices these
variables inherit the serial correlation of the model’s underlying shocks. Siu
(2004) also states that with sticky prices the autocorrelations of these objects
are near unity regardless of the persistence in the shock process, thus partially
1See eg Barro-Gordon (1983), Rogoﬀ (1985) and Svensson (1997).
7reviving Barro’s random walk result. The ﬁnding is similar to Aiyagari et al
(2002), who consider optimal policy in a model with incomplete markets.
In this paper we analyse the monetary impact of alternative ﬁscal policy
rules. We do not base the ﬁscal policy behaviour on optimisation, since we
are more interested in diﬀerent ﬁscal policy regimes. We formulate alternative
ﬁscal policy rules using the debt and the deﬁcit, both mentioned as measures
of ﬁscal policy performance in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). We do
this in a New Keynesian model, with endogenous labour supply, distortionary
taxation and no private capital. The economy is hit by two fundamental
shocks: demand and supply shocks, which are orthogonal to each other.
Monetary policy is conducted by an independent central bank that will
optimise, but the ﬁscal authority has to follow a rule.
We show that under discretionary monetary policy, ﬁscal policy matters
to inﬂation bias. If the central bank is able to commit, inﬂation bias
disappears. More importantly, under the timeless perspective of monetary
policy precommitment by Woodford (1999), output persistence increases
signiﬁcantly compared to the discretionary case. We also revive Barro’s (1979)
random walk result with the deﬁcit rule for both under commitment and
discretionary monetary policy irrespective of the ﬁscal policy regime. With
the debt rule the Barro result does not hold for the high debt to GDP target
values, and the tax rate inherits the stochastic nature of underlying shocks.
The paper is organised as follows. Chapter 2 describes the economy: the
behaviour of the household and the ﬁrm. It sets up the policy target for both
the central bank and the ﬁscal authority. In Chapter 3 we set up our simulation
procedure and introduce all the results. Chapter 4 concludes the discussion.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a production economy with a representative ﬁrm, an inﬁnitely
lived representative consumer and a public sector. There is a private
production good ct and a public good gt that satisfy the resource constraint
yt = ct + gt, (2.1)
where yt is the aggregate production. The available production technology is
represented as a constant returns to scale production function
yt = Alt, (2.2)
where lt is labour input and A =Λ teζ∗Time denotes technological progress.
Stochastic ﬂuctuations around a deterministic trend in the log of productivity
zt ≡ lnΛt are given by an exogenous AR(1) process












tu(ct,m t,l t;gt) (2.4)
8subject to the budget constraint
ct + mt − (1 − πt)mt−1 + bt ≤ (1 + rt−1)bt−1 + wtlt(1 − τt)+Π t, (2.5)
where mt is real money balances, bt is government bonds held by the household
in real terms, wt is the real gross wage rate, τt is the tax rate and Πt is the
real proﬁt from the ﬁrm the household owns2. The household’s discount factor
is δ and Et is the expectation operator conditional on information available
in period t. We assume that the utility function u(ct,m t,l t;gt) is continuous,
increasing and concave.
The ﬁrst order conditions are
uc(ct,m t,l t;gt) − ξt =0 , (2.6)
um(ct,m t,l t;gt) − ξt + δEt

ξt+1 (1 − πt+1)

=0 , (2.7)
ul (ct,m t,l t;gt)+ξtwt(1 − τt)=0 , (2.8)
ξt = δEtξt+1 (1 + rt), (2.9)
where ξ is the Lagrangean multiplier and subscripts note partial derivatives.














ul (ct,m t,l t;gt)=−uc(ct,m t,l t;gt)wt(1 − τt). (2.12)













1+λ +f (gt). This is a CRRA utility function,
where σ ≥ 0 is the elasticity of the intertemporal substitution of consumption
and Γ is a positive constant. λ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of the
labour supply. Using the periodical utility function, the ﬁrst order conditions


















t wt(1 − τt). (2.15)
Combining (2.13) and (2.14) with the resource constraint yields3
2Inﬂation π is deﬁned as
Pt−Pt−1
Pt = πt, which implies that 1 − πt =
Pt−1
Pt . The nominal
interest rate Rt is 1+Rt =( 1+rt)/(1 − πt+1),w h e r ert is the real interest rate and πt+1
is the ex post expected inﬂation rate .
3First we loglinearise the equations (2.13) and (2.14) and following Uhlig (1999).
Log-linearisation of (2.1) around the steady state yields ￿ yt = c
y￿ ct +
g
y￿ gt. Since we want
to write IS and LM in (log) levels, we apply the deﬁnition of the logarithmic deviations, eg





, and the steady state conditions. See Railavo (2003) for details.
9lnyt = Etlnyt+1 +
g
y
























A proﬁt maximising ﬁrm hires labour, and produces and sells products in a
monopolistically competitive goods market4. The ﬁrm produces a single good
with labour lt and pays the wage wt per unit of labour. We can write the real

























−1 = mct. (2.19)
Taking natural logarithms of (2.19) and using the deﬁnition of technological
development A =Λ teζ∗Time yields
λlnyt−(1 + λ)lnΛ t−(1 + λ)ζ∗Time+σlnct−ln(1 − τt)=l nmct. (2.20)
In a ﬂexible price equilibrium the nominal price equals the mark-up over




















t is the level of ﬂexible price output with a distortionary tax rate, and










To ﬁnd the pricing equation of the ﬁrm, we follow Rotemberg (1987).
We assume that there exists costs to the ﬁrm when it changes prices. This
assumption will introduce price stickiness and reﬂect the empirical aspect that
individual price setting is lumpy. The forward-looking ﬁrm sets prices by

















where β = 1
(1+r),r > 0 is the discount factor and a is an adjustment cost
parameter. By taking the ﬁrst order conditions of (2.22), rearranging terms
and using the supply function (2.21), the New Keynesian Phillips curve yields








4We assume that the labour market is perfectly competitive.
5In real terms mct = 1
µ,w h e r eµ is the mark-up. In the steady state lnmc =l n1
µ. See
Railavo (2003) for details.
6Combine (2.20) with the loglinearised resource contraint. Using the steady state
conditon of (2.20) we can again convert the loglinearised equation into a (log) levels form.
7Note that zt ≡ lnΛt.
10Public sector behaviour is characterised by a budget constraint, an expenditure
path, a monetary policy delegated to a central bank and a ﬁscal policy rule.
The intertemporal budget constraint for the policy authority links debt and
policy choices. The real ﬂow budget constraint can be written as
bt + τtyt + πtmt−1 + mt − mt−1 =( 1+rt−1)bt−1 + gt, (2.24)
where bt is the government bonds, τtyt is the tax revenue, mt is the nominal
money balances, rt is the real interest rate and gt is the public spending.
The policy authority balances its budget with new debt, with taxes and
seigniorage revenue (πtmt−1 + mt − mt−1). The intertemporal government
budget constraint, which sums up the expected budget surpluses, is given by





(πt+imt−1+i + mt+i − mt−1+i (2.25)
+τt+iyt+i − gt+i).

















where γ is a constant public consumption to GDP ratio. Innovations σ2
ν and
σ2
εg of fundamental shocks are orthogonal to each other.
Monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank following
Rogoﬀ (1985). Optimal monetary policy is based on minimising a loss function
common to the central bank and society. The welfare loss of the central bank






















where π∗ is the inﬂation target, χ is the positive parameter that reﬂects the







κ ζ ∗ Time+ ε
y∗
t is the desired level of potential output for the central bank
(see Appendix A). The central bank targets the eﬃcient level of output in the
absence of the monopolistic distortion. Also the non distorted ﬂexible price
output does not depend on the households’ labour supply decisions. Rotemberg
and Woodford (1998) have shown that the loss measure can be derived by
approximating the expected utility of a representative household when χ>0.
As mentioned in Aoki and Nikolov (2003), the analysis is valid for arbitrary
values of χ.
11In discretionary case the central bank minimises the discounted losses
subject to the Phillips curve (2.23). Substituting the Phillips curve into the


























Under discretion, once expectations about future inﬂation Etπt+1 are formed,
the central bank optimises taking them as given. Hence, we get a sequence of
static minimisation problems, see eg Cukierman (1992, Chapter 3). Optimal
















As a result, a central bank that emphasises output at all, creates an inﬂationary
bias to the economy. Cukierman (1992 ) recalls the point made by Barro
and Gordon (1983): under discretion the inﬂationary bias of the monetary
policy carries over to the case in which the central bank cares about the future





















ln(1 − τt). (2.31)
Substitute (2.31) into the IS curve (2.16) and solve for the optimal nominal
























The equation (2.32) has a resemblance to the Taylor (1993) rule. The implied
interest rate rule satisﬁes the Taylor principle, ie the interest rate reacts more
than one-for-one to an increase in inﬂation, in which case the monetary policy
is often called active in the relevant literature.
Under commitment the central bank does not take expectations about
future inﬂation as given. Then the central bank’s objective is to pick πt+i,
8Under discretion, once the expectation about the future inﬂation Etπt+1 is formed,
the central bank reoptimise taking them as given. Hence, we can treat the mimimisation
problem in isolation for period t. See Chapter 3 in Cukierman(1992).




































































−1Et (θt+i)=0 . (2.36)
From (2.36) we obtain that Et(θt+i)=0for all i>0. As mentioned in Walsh
(2003), this reﬂects the fact that the equation (2.16) imposes no real constraint
on the central bank as long as there are no restrictions on varying the nominal
interest rate.
Under commitment the central bank not only care about the future and
present as suggested by Barro and Gordon (1983), but also about the past.
Woodford (1999) calls such a policy optimal from a timeless perspective.
Woodford (2003, Chapter 7) states that a time-invariant policy is optimal from
a timeless perspective if the equilibrium evolution from any date t0 onward is
optimal, subject to the constraint that the economy’s initial evolution be the
one associated with the policy in question. Under a timeless perspective we




































By substituting the ﬁrst order conditions (2.34) and (2.35) into the Phillips


















Combining equations (2.37) and (2.38), we have the optimal monetary policy

















































+βEtπt+1 + πt−1 − a[ln(1 − τt) − ln(1 − τt−1)].
Substitute (2.39) into the IS curve (2.16) and solve for the nominal interest












































Fiscal policy, following Leeper (1991), is represented as a debt rule
τt = τ
∗ + φ[bt−1 + mt−1]/yt − ψ1. (2.42)
Here, τ∗ is a positive constant representing a long-run tax rate9, bt−1+mt−1 are
the real government liabilities, ψ>0 represents the debt to GDP ratio target
and φ is the ﬁscal policy parameter. The higher values φ gets, the more weight
the ﬁscal authority places on balancing the government budget. Railavo (2003)
has shown that this type of ﬁscal policy rule results in a stable solution with
Taylor rule type monetary policy if inﬂation response is more than one-for-one
with a wide range of positive ﬁscal policy rule parameter values.
We also explore other ﬁscal policy rules. The government liabilities in the
ﬁscal policy rule (2.42) can be replaced by the government primary deﬁcit, in
which case the ﬁscal policy rule is a deﬁcit rule of the form
τt = τ
∗ +Ω[ gt − τtyt + Rtbt−1]/yt − ψ2, (2.43)
where the primary deﬁcit is gt−τtyt and the interest payment on the real debt
outstanding is Rtbt−1. This is the SGP deﬁnition of the deﬁcit and conforms
closely with the deﬁcit based on the real government budget constraint. See
Railavo (2004) for details.
An alternative to the Leeper (1991) way of writing a ﬁscal policy rule is to
use the diﬀerence of the tax rate. It resemblance an error-correction approach
and the gradualistic speciﬁcation is more realistic than the Leeper type as the
9τ∗ is related to the long-run tax rate, since
bt−1+mt−1
yt need not be equal to zero.
14tax rate movement is smoother. An error-correction debt rule can be written
as follows
τt = τt−1 + φ[(bt−1 + mt−1) − ψ1yt]/yt. (2.44)
Railavo (2004) shows that (2.44) is highly unstable for a large range of positive
parameter φ values when the monetary policy is active. Therefore we shall
not study the eﬀects of shocks under (2.44) using the stochastic simulation
procedure described below. On the other hand, the corresponding ﬁscal policy
rule with the deﬁcit
τt = τt−1 +Ω[ ( gt − τtyt + Rtbt−1) − ψ2yt]/yt (2.45)
produces stable solutions for a wide range of ﬁscal policy parameter, Ω,v a l u e s
as shown in Railavo (2004), and, hence, will be used in simulations.
3 Stochastic simulation
We analyse the time-series properties of inﬂation, the interest rate, output, the
debt to GDP ratio and the tax rate as a response to the fundamental stochastic
shocks. The stochastic nature of exogenous variables is given by (2.3) and
(2.26). We also show the relationship with inﬂation, the interest rate, the debt
to GDP ratio and the tax rate in the steady state. Our simulation procedure
involves simulating the model given by equations (2.16), (2.17), (2.21), (2.23),
(2.24) and (4.6). Monetary policy is either discretionary (2.31) or follows the
commitment solution (2.39). Fiscal policy is conducted with diﬀerent policy
rules (2.42), (2.43) or (2.45). The initial and terminal values are set equal to
the steady state values of the model.
We solve the model 2500 times to obtain a set of time series, which are then
used to compute the variability and persistence statistics. In our procedure,
simulations are done in a recursive manner. In the ﬁrst round the model is
simulated for 2500 periods, in the second round 2499 periods, etc. In each
simulation round, the current period shocks ν and εg are drawn from N (0,σ 2
ν)
and N (0,σ 2
εg) distributions, but for subsequent periods their values are set for
zero. We have set σ2
ν =0 .01 and σ2
εg i ss e tt ob eo n ep e r c e n to ft h eG D P .
Following Cooley and Prescott (1995), we have set ρ =0 .81, which reﬂects
that 95 percent of the technology shock remains after one quarter. Respectively
we set ρg =0 .975 according to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which means that
95 percent of the government spending shock still remains after 2 years. The
model is calibrated to reﬂect the economic structure of a large economy and
the key parameter values of the model are given in Table 1.
Table 2 shows the steady state results with the debt rule (2.42) and
discretionary monetary policy (2.31). We let the ﬁscal policy rule parameter
φ vary from 0.1 to 1.5 and the debt to GDP ratio target ψ1 from a tight target
(0) to a loose target (1.5). As concluded in Railavo (2003 and 2004), the low
values of the ﬁscal policy rule parameter indicate active ﬁscal policy while the
higher values refer to passive policy. As deﬁned in Leeper (1991), the passive
ﬁscal policy authority must generate suﬃcient tax revenues to balance the
15σ λ a Γ δ β
0.157 1.433 0.003 0.7 0.97 0.97
π∗ τ∗ ζ χ
g
y
0.02 0.24 0.018 0.05 0.4
Table 1: The parameter values used and not altered in simulation
φ 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.5


































































Table 2: Discretionary monetary policy with the debt rule
budget regardless of inﬂation, whereas the active authority is not constrained
by budgetary conditions. Monetary policy is active with both discretionary
and commitment monetary policy. The steady state values of the tax rules
(2.42) and (2.43) depend on the values of the ﬁscal policy parameter φ and
Ω, respectively, and also on the values of the target, ψ1 and ψ2, respectively.
However, the steady state values of the tax rules (2.44) and (2.45) do not
depend on the values of the ﬁscal policy parameter φ and Ω, respectively, but
only on the values of the target, ψ1 and ψ2, respectively.
We can see from Table 2 that there is inﬂation bias with discretionary
monetary policy, as inﬂation is above the target value, π∗ =0 .02.W e a l s o
see that the size of the bias depends on the ﬁscal policy parameter, φ,v a l u e s
and the debt to GDP target, ψ1, values. Loosening the debt to GDP target
increases the steady state debt to GDP ratio and the steady state inﬂation
increases. The high tax rate is associated with the high debt to GDP ratios,
which feeds into inﬂation. The debt to GDP ratio decreases as the ﬁscal
policy parameter gets larger values, ie the ﬁscal policy authority reacts more
with the tax rate. The largest changes in the steady state values happen when
the ﬁscal policy parameter, φ, changes from 0.1 to 0.5. With higher values
of φ, the change in the steady state values of inﬂation, the tax rate and the
interest rate is small compared to the changes in the debt to GDP ratio. Also,
with the φ =0 .1, the change in the target parameter has the largest impact
on the steady state values of inﬂation and the tax rate. This indicates that
there is strong non-linearity with the low values of φ.
16Ω 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.5


































































Table 3: Discretionary monetary policy with the deﬁcit rule
Table 3 shows the steady state ratios with the deﬁcit rule (2.43).N o w
the deﬁcit to GDP target ψ2 gets values between zero and 0.1 as the ﬁscal
policy rule parameter Ω runs from 0.1 to 1.5. Again, we see that increasing
the target makes the debt to GDP ratio increase, which has an impact on
inﬂation. We also see that the low values of the ﬁscal policy rule parameter
result in an extremely high debt to GDP ratio in the steady state. The high
debt levels are associated with the high tax rate and with the low ﬁscal policy
parameter value. Overall, the debt and deﬁcit rule results in similar steady
state responses to changes in the ﬁscal policy parameter and target values.
Table 4 shows the steady state values under the deﬁcit rule (2.45). Now the
ﬁscal policy parameter Ω has an impact neither on the steady state tax rate
nor on the steady state debt to GDP level. Increase in the deﬁcit target ψ2
increases the steady state debt to GDP ratio and inﬂation. However, changing
the deﬁcit target has a small eﬀect on the level of the steady state inﬂation
compared on the quite large impact to the debt to GDP ratio.
Tables 5 and 6 display the steady state values when the monetary policy
authority is able to commit. As expected, inﬂation will be at the target level
for all combinations of the ﬁscal policy parameter and the target values. With
the debt rule (2.42), the debt to GDP ratio will increase as the ﬁscal policy
parameter φ value decreases and the debt to GDP target ψ1 value increases.
With the error-correction deﬁcit rule (2.45), the ﬁscal policy parameter does
not have an eﬀect on the steady state debt to GDP ratios. However, the debt
to GDP ratio will increase as the deﬁcit target increases, which results in a
higher steady state tax rate.
Tables 7 to 11 display the variability and persistence statistics as a response
to the underlying fundamental stochastic shocks. We let the ﬁscal policy
parameters, φ and Ω, vary from 0.1 to 1.5 and the target parameter value
changes from low (tight) to higher values (looser).
Barro (1979) claims that an optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy problem
results in an optimal tax rate and debt will follow a random walk. Lucas
and Stokey (1983) and Chari et al (1991 and 1994) show that with ﬂexible
17Ω 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.5


































































Table 4: Discretionary monetary policy with the error-correction deﬁcit rule
φ 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.5


































































Table 5: Committed monetary policy with the debt rule
18Ω 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.5


































































Table 6: Committed monetary policy with the error-correction deﬁcit rule
prices Barro’s result of an optimal tax rate to follow a random walk does
not hold. Chari et al (1991 and 1994) also claim that the tax rate and debt
inherit the serial correlation of the model’s underlying shocks. Siu (2004)
found that in a sticky price model, especially in the case in which government
ﬁnances spending by increasing taxes, resulting in an accumulated debt, the
autocorrelations of the debt to GDP ratio and the tax rate are near unity
regardless of the persistence in the shock process, partially reviving Barro’s
random walk result.
In Table 7 we can see that the variability of inﬂation decreases as the
parameter φ in the debt rule (2.42) gets larger values, but the variability
of the tax rate increases. The variability of both inﬂation and the tax rate
increases as the debt to GDP ratio target, ψ1, gets larger values. Inﬂation
and the interest rate are highly autocorrelated for all the parameter values.
The persistence of the debt to GDP ratio and the tax rate decreases as both
or either the ﬁscal policy parameter and the debt to GDP ratio target get
larger values. With the low target values, ie the low steady state debt to GDP
ratio, the autocorrelation of the debt to GDP ratio and the tax rate are near
unity supporting Barro’s (1979) result. However, increasing the target values,
ie making the debt to GDP ratio less restrictive, reduces the autocorrelation
of the variables and supports the Chari et al (1991 and 1994) result even in a
sticky price model. Output variability and persistence remain quite constant
and low regardless of the changes in the parameter values.
Table 8 repeats the previous results now with the deﬁcit rule (2.43).T h e
overall results are similar to the previous results, but the persistence of the
debt to GDP ratio and the tax rate do not decrease with the increase of the
values of the Ω and ψ2 parameters. Now we ﬁnd support for Barro (1979) and
Siu (2004) with all parameter value combinations. The change in ﬁscal policy
do not aﬀect the persistence of the tax rate. However, output persistence and
volatility do not improve due to results with the debt rule.
The introduction of the error-correction deﬁcit rule (2.45) does not change
the results signiﬁcantly compared with the deﬁcit rule (2.43), as can be seen in
19Table 9. The persistence of inﬂation, the interest rate, the debt to GDP ratio
and the tax rate remains high. However, the variability of inﬂation decreases
with the low ﬁscal policy parameter Ω values compared with the results of
the deﬁcit rule. This is due to the fact that the ﬁscal policy parameter has
no impact on the debt to GDP ratio and hence on the level of inﬂation with
the error-correction deﬁcit rule. The variability of the debt to GDP ratio is
smaller when the debt to GDP ratio level is smaller.
In Table 10 we see the results with committed monetary policy (2.39) and
the debt rule (2.42). We can see that under the commitment of monetary
policy output persistence increases signiﬁcantly compared to the discretionary
case. This demonstrates the timeless perspective of monetary policy as optimal
monetary policy under commitment (2.40) displays a lagged inﬂation term. As
the persistence increases there is a considerable increase in the variability of
output. Whereas the variability of output increases under commitment, that
of inﬂation and the interest rate falls. The variability of the tax rate and
the debt to GDP ratio remain relatively similar with both discretionary and
committed monetary policy. However, the persistence of the two increases
somewhat, especially with the high ﬁscal policy and debt to GDP ratio target
values. Still, the autocorrelation of the two variables gives support to the
Barro ﬁnding when the target has low values. As the debt to GDP increases
and the ﬁscal policy reacts more with taxes, the autocorrelation drops and the
tax rate inherits the serial correlation of the shock as in Chari et al (1991 and
1994).
The same result shows up with the deﬁcit rule (2.45). The results inTable
11 are similar to the results of discretionary monetary policy with the deﬁcit
rule except for output. Like in the previous case, the volatility and persistence
of output has increased signiﬁcantly compared with the discretionary monetary
policy case. The autocorrelation of the debt to GDP ratio and the tax
rate will remain high, reﬂecting Barro’s results with all the ﬁscal parameter
combinations.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we analysed the eﬀects of alternative ﬁscal policy rules with
optimal monetary policy. With discretionary monetary policy, inﬂation bias
depends on the ﬁscal policy with both the debt and deﬁcit rule. The ﬁscal
policy parameter and the target values, hence the ﬁscal policy regime, aﬀect
the size of the bias. The higher values the ﬁscal policy parameter and the target
parameter get the higher the steady state debt to GDP ratio is and inﬂation
becomes. The target parameter changes increase inﬂation more evenly, but
the policy parameter changes are more notable between low values than with
high values.
With the error-correction deﬁcit rule, the ﬁscal policy parameter has no
impact on the steady state tax rate and, also, on the steady state debt to
GDP level. A rise in the deﬁcit target increases the steady state debt to GDP
ratio and inﬂation. However, changing the deﬁcit target has a small eﬀect on
20the level of the steady state inﬂation compared to the quite large impact on
the debt to GDP ratio.
The stochastic simulation results show that under central bank
commitment, output persistence increases compared to the discretionary
case. The result is derived using the timeless perspective approach to
precommitment by Woodford (1999). Under the timeless perspective, inﬂation
and output persistence reﬂects the economic data. The ﬁscal policy is also
compatible with the optimal monetary policy from timeless a perspective and
the result holds also with alternative ﬁscal policy rules. The ﬁscal policy
parameter and the target values do not aﬀect the persistence of inﬂation
and output. However, the variability of output increases compared to the
discretionary case.
With the deﬁcit rules, the autocorrelation of the tax rate is near unity
irrespective of the monetary policy regime, and irrespective of the ﬁscal policy
parameters and targets. Thus we revive Barro’s (1979) random walk result
with the deﬁcit rules. With the debt rules and the high debt to GDP target
values, the Barro result does not hold and the tax rate inherits the stochastic
nature of underlying shocks. With the error-correction type of ﬁscal policy
rule, the tax rate changes are smooth as the autocorrelation is near unity with
all combinations of the ﬁscal policy parameter and the deﬁcit to GDP target
values.
21References
Aiyagari, S.R. — Marcet, A. — Sargent, T.J. — Seppälä, J. (2002) Optimal
Taxation without State-Contingent Debt. Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 110, No. 6, 1220—1254.
Aoki, K. — Nikolov, K. (2003) Rule-Based Monetary Policy Under
Central Bank Learning. Paper held at Bank of Finland/CEPR Annual
Workshop, Helsinki, 2/3 October 2003.
Barro, R.J. (1979) On Determination of the Public Debt. Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 87, Issue 5, Part 1, 940—971.
Barro, R.J. — Gordon, D.B. (1983) A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy
in a Natural Rate Model. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, No. 4,
589—610.
Benhabib, J. — Wen, Y. (2004) Indeterminacy, Aggregate Demand, and
the Real Business Cycle. Journal of Monetary Economics 51, 503—530.
Blanchard, O. — Perotti, R. (2002) An Empirical Characterization of the
Dynamic Eﬀects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on
Output. Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1329—1368.
Chari, V.V. — Christiano, L.J. — Kehoe, P.J. (1991) O p t i m a lF i s c a la n d
Monetary Policy: Some Recent Results. Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, Vol. 23, Issue 3, Part 2, 519—539.
Chari, V.V. — Christiano, L.J. — Kehoe, P.J. (1994) O p t i m a lF i s c a lP o l i c y
in a Business Cycle Model. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102,
Issue 4, 617—652.
Cooley, T.F. — Prescott, E.C. (1995) Economic Growth and Business
Cycles. In Cooley, T.F. (Ed.) Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, Princeton
University Press.
Cukierman, A. (1992) Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and
Independence: Theory and Evidence. MIT Press.
Leeper, E.M. (1991) Equilibria under ‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ Monetary
and Fiscal Policies. Journal of Monetary Economics 27, 129—147.
Lucas, R.E. — Stokey, N.L. (1983) Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in
an Economy without Capital. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 55—93.
Railavo, J. (2003) Eﬀects of the Supply-side Channel on Stabilisation
Properties of Policy Rules. Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 34/2003.
Railavo, J. (2004) Stability Consequences of Fiscal Policy Rules. Bank
of Finland Discussion Papers 1/2004.
22Rogoﬀ, K. (1985) The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an
Intermediate Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
November, 1169—1189.
Rotemberg, J.J. (1987) The New Keynesian Microfoundations. In Fisher,
S. (Ed.) NBER Macroeconomic Annual, MIT Press.
Rotemberg, J.J. — Woodford, M. (1998) An Optimization-Based
Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy:
Expanded Version. NBER Technical Working Paper 233.
Sargent, T.J. — Wallace, N. (1981) Some Unpleasant Monetarist
Arithmetic. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol.
5, No. 3, 1—17.
Schmitt-Grohé, S. — Uribe, M. (2003) Optimal Simple and Implementable
Monetary and Fiscal Rules. Mimeo Duke University. Available at
http://www.econ.duke.edu/~grohe/
Schmitt-Grohé, S. — Uribe, M. (2004a) Optimal Fiscal and Monetary
P o l i c yU n d e rS t i c k yP r i c e s .Journal of Economic Theory, 198—230.
Schmitt-Grohé, S. — Uribe, M. (2004b) Optimal Fiscal and Monetary
Policy Under Imperfect Competition. Journal of Macroeconomics,
183—209.
Siu, H.E. (2004) Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy with Sticky
Prices. Journal of Monetary Economics 51, 575—607.
Svensson, L.E.O. (1997) Optimal Inﬂation Targets, ‘Conservative’
Central Banks, and Linear Inﬂation Contracts. American Economic
Review, Vol. 87, No. 1, 98—114.
Taylor, J.B. (1993) Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice.
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 195—214.
Woodford, M. (1999) Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia. Manchester
School Supplement, 1—35.
Woodford, M. (2003) Interest and Prices. Foundations of a Theory of
Monetary Policy. Princeton University Press.
23Appendix A1 Potential output without distortionary
taxes
Let’s rewrite the household’s budget constraint with lump sum taxation
ct + mt − (1 − πt)mt−1 + bt ≤ (1 + rt−1)bt−1 + wtlt − Tt, (4.1)
where Tt is lump sum taxes. Now the household’s utility maximisation using









1+λ +f (gt) yields

































−(1+λ) = mct. (4.4)
In order to log-linearise (4.4), ﬁrst substitute in the process for technological
progress A =Λ teζ∗Time and take natural logarithms. Use the deﬁnition  xt =











 yt − σ
g
c
 gt − (1 + λ)  Λt =  mct. (4.5)















t is the level of ﬂexible price output, which is the desired level of output









κ zt.10 As we can see from
(2.21) and (4.6), the long-run ﬂexible price output and the desired level of
output are both hit by the same technology shock (2.3).
10Note that zt ≡ lnΛt.






































































































































































Table 7: Discretionary monetary policy with the debt rule
Note: corr. is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient.






































































































































































Table 8: Discretionary monetary policy with the deﬁcit rule
Note: corr. is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient.






































































































































































Table 9: Discretionary monetary policy with the error-correction deﬁcit rule
Note: corr. is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient.






































































































































































Table 10: Committed monetary policy with the debt rule
Note: corr. is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient.






































































































































































Table 11: Committed monetary policy with the error-correction deﬁcit rule
Note: corr. is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient.
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